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Recent  years  have  seen  a  significant  improvement  in  the  economic 
performance of some African countries. The resulting increased dispersion in 
income  levels  across  Africa,  combined  with  the  pertinence  of  detecting 
regional role models renders an intra-African analysis more attractive. In this 
paper I estimate the respective contribution of institutions, geography, and 
policies  in  determining  income  levels  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  I  find  that 
income per capita in this region can be explained to a large extent with a few 
variables: quality of economic institutions, trade, population density in the 19
th 
century, investment, mineral resources, and a dummy variable for small island 
nations. Contrary to other regions in the world, some policy variables remain 
significant after controlling for institutions in Africa. Measures of geography 
(climate, disease ecology, rainfall) have no direct effect on income levels once 
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    1.      INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The  poor  economic  performance  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  since  the 
1970’s has received considerable attention in recent literature on economic 
development.  Most  growth  regressions  employed  in  literature  use  a  near-
global sample of countries and impose the same specification for all regions 
save for the inclusion of regional dummies as level or interaction effects (Paul 
Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, 1999a). These regional dummies (in this 
case  an  Africa  dummy)  are  at  times  statistically  significant  and  negative: 
although African slow growth can be explained to some extent with a few 
variables  measuring  environment  and  institutions,  the  Africa  dummy 
remained  often  significant.  This  clearly  suggests  a  hitherto  not  captured 
element  specific  to  African  countries.  Accordingly,  scholars  examined 
alternative specifications with the purpose to eliminate the importance of the 
Africa  dummy
1.  However,  this  debate  has  not,  as  yet,  reached  conclusive 
results and the factors behind the Africa dummy (usually negative) remain 
elusive in much of the current research. Collier and Gunning (1999a) provide 
an alternative explanation: it is possible that the persistence of a significant 
Africa dummy in the regressions is attributable to inadequate proxies for the 
main  impediments  to  growth  (high  risk,  inadequate  social  capital,  and 
inadequate infrastructure), which are particularly severe problems in Africa.   
 
One  limitation  of  this  identification  strategy  consists  of  considering  sub-
Saharan Africa as a homogeneous block of countries with under-performing 
economies. In reality, disparities in income levels within Africa are vast and 
recent  years  have  seen  a  significant  improvement  in  the  economic 
performance of the continent
2. A few African countries have started to grow 
very fast, while others descended into social and economic chaos. The result is 
                                                
1 For example, Sachs and Warner (1997) find a significant “tropics” variable thereby causing the Africa 
dummy to become insignificant. 
2 See table A3.   4 
greater dispersion among countries. For that reason, an intra-African analysis 
is today more pertinent than it could possibly have been fifteen years ago.  
In  this  paper,  I  will  review  previously  proposed growth determinants  in  a 
sample restricted to African countries that allows for investigating possible 
heterogeneity in explanatory factors. Idiosyncratic risk, particular to Africa 
and not replicated in other developing regions, is best identified in a sample 
restricted to Africa. Additionally, the detection of regional role models might 
induce significant demonstration effects in the rest of the continent. Within-
continent models may be important because the information is both closer to 
hand and more evidently pertinent (Collier and Gunning, 1999b). 
 
Several  recent  cross-country  analyses  of  economic  growth,  although  not 
always specifically targeted at African countries, present conclusions that help 
explain  Africa’s  poor  economic  performance.  There  are  essentially  two 
different views for explaining different development outcomes in the long run: 
geography and institutions. Both groups are here considered in a broad sense. 
Accordingly, the geography strand includes location, climate, ecology, and 
even  specific  precipitation/rainfall  variables,  while  the  institutions  view  is 
regarded  as including  explanations  coming  from literature on such diverse 
topics as economic and political institutions, policies, relative inequality and 
even armed conflicts.      
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) refer to the importance of poor economic policies in 
Africa (particularly the lack of openness to international markets) and add 
geographical factors such as tropical climate and lack of access to seaports as 
having also contributed to Africa’s slow growth. Sachs (2001) sums up the 
numerous ways in which physical geography might have contributed to the 
income gap between tropical and temperate regions. This essay discusses the 
importance of production technologies in the tropics lagging behind temperate 
zone  technology  in  the  critical  areas  of  agriculture  and  health,  and  the   5 
difficulty in mobilizing energy resources in tropical economies. A subsequent 
paper (Sachs, 2003) shows that geographical and ecological variables (in this 
case malaria transmission) have a direct effect on income levels even after 
controlling for institutional quality. 
A general decline in rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa in the latter half of the 20
th 
century has also received some attention in the literature. Barrios et al. (2003) 
explore this avenue empirically in an economic growth framework and find 
that this decline of rainfall can be imputed with between 13% and 36% of the 
income gap of Africa relative to other developing countries. 
 
The  explanations  advanced  by  the  institutions  view  are  necessarily 
heterogeneous due to broad definition of institutions herein considered. 
Mauro  (1995)  finds  that  corruption  lowers  investment,  thereby  lowering 
economic  growth  (an  index  of  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,  henceforth 
ELF, is used as an instrument for corruption). ELF is highly correlated with 
corruption and other institutional variables and the author assumes that ELF is 
exogenous to economic variables. A related finding is that corrupt, unstable 
governments invest less on education: it is possible that education expenditure 
provides less corruption opportunities (Mauro, 1993). 
A different strand of the literature links ELF to poor growth and public goods 
outcomes.  Easterly  and  Levine  (1997)  report  that  ethnic  diversity  helps 
explain  cross-country  differences  in  public  policies,  political  stability,  and 
other economic indicators. The authors argue that Africa’s low growth record 
is  associated  with  low  schooling,  political  instability,  underdeveloped 
financial  systems,  distorted  foreign  exchange  markets,  high  government 
deficits,  and  insufficient  markets.  ELF  is  suggested  to  help  explain  a 
significant part of Africa’s poor performance in these proximate causes for 
economic growth. More recently, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) contributed 
considerably to the flourishing ELF literature. Apart from resolving problems 
involved with correctly measuring ELF, they find evidence that ELF has more   6 
negative  effects  at  lower  levels  of  income,  and  less  negative  effects  in 
democracies. This negative effect is partly channelled through public goods, 
as social planners tend to choose smaller provision of public goods in the 
presence of a larger number of ethnic groups. 
 Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) argue that ELF is less responsible for Africa’s 
civil  wars  than  previously  assumed.  They  find  that  political  instability  in 
Africa is mostly due to high levels of poverty (reducing the opportunity cost 
of  rebel  labour),  failed  political  institutions  (ethnic  groups  might  not  feel 
adequately represented at national level), and economic dependence on natural 
resources (increasing the incentive for loot-seeking). Interestingly, the authors 
suggest that ELF and natural resource dependence might work as threshold 
variables: up to a point natural resources add to the incentive for loot-seeking, 
passing this point provide sufficient resources for the government to set up 
capable security forces and to buy support. The same reasoning holds for the 
ELF  variable,  as  it  is  easier  to  start  and  support  rebellions  in  polarized 
societies (with ELF indices around 0.5) than in highly fragmented societies 
(with ELF indices closer to 1) where it is certainly easier for the government 
to divide them
3. 
This argument has remarkable implications since polarized societies are much 
more  frequent  in  the  Americas  than  in  Africa.  Typically,  Latin  American 
societies are polarized into two main ethnic groups: Europeans/Africans in 
Brazil and the Caribbean, and Europeans/Amerindians in much of remaining 
Latin  America.  In  comparison,  African  societies  tend  to  be  much  more 
fragmented into numerous “tribes” with a median ELF index of 0.71 for sub-
Saharan Africa.       
Barro  (1999)  and  Easterly  (2000)  discuss  the  effects  of  relative  income 
inequality  on  economic  growth.  Barro  (1999)  finds  that  higher  inequality 
tends to retard growth in poor countries. Among the advanced explanations 
for this causality, credit-market imperfections (the poor have limited access to 
                                                
3 See figure 1.1.   7 
credit)  and  socio-political  unrest  (disruptive  activities  in  general  cause 
uncertainty  and  non-productive  efforts  such  as  criminal  activities  and 
defensive efforts) seem particularly pertinent for a study on African economic 
performance. A related line of research is found in Easterly (2000). He finds 
econometric evidence that supports the Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) thesis 
that tropical commodity exporters are more unequal than other societies, and 
concludes that a high share of income for the middle classes and relatively 
low ethnic polarization distinguishes economic success stories from failures.  
 
Finally,  some authors prefer to emphasize  institutions  as an encompassing 
framework  instead  of  focusing  on  more  specific  institutional  factors  (e.g. 
corruption). It is impossible to be exhaustive when referring to research on the 
link  between  institutions  and  economic  development,  so  here  I  refer  two 
recent papers that add to this subject: Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that factor 
endowments  may  have  affected  growth  outcomes  indirectly  through 
institutions, as colonial powers set up different sets of institutions according to 
local characteristics regarding climate and disease environment. According to 
their  thesis,  institutions  that  encourage  economic  growth  emerge  when 
political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based 
property rights enforcement, when they create constraints on power-holders, 
and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by those who hold the 
political power. 
Levine (2005) also focuses on the importance of secure property rights and 
presents  two  different  views  that  help  explain  why  property  rights  differ 
greatly among different countries: legal traditions and factor endowments. He 
concludes  that  the  law  view  and  the  endowments  hypothesis  are  not 
contradictory  and  that  indeed  both  are  statistically  significant  when  used 
simultaneously.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive review of Africa’s problems is available in 
Collier and Gunning (1999b) and Collier and Gunning (1999a). The authors   8 
go over the existing literature and identify four factors as being particularly 
important:  the  lack  of  openness  to  international  trade;  a  high-risk 
environment; a low level of social capital; and poor infrastructure. 
 
It is in this framework that the present paper proposes to add to the research 
on  African  development.  Contrary  to  popular  belief,  income  differences 
among  African  nations  are  not  smaller  than  in  other  continents  and  this 
provides the starting point for this paper. To my knowledge, this is the first 
time that econometric analysis is conducted with a sample that is deliberately 
restricted to sub-Saharan African countries in order to identify the specific 
degrees of influence that explanatory factors have in this region.  
For that purpose, the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
African economic performance in space and time. Section 3 presents the data 
and descriptive statistics. The results of my level regression analysis are given 
in section 4 and section 5 concludes.                          
 
    2.      ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA 
  
Prior to 1885 the colonization of Africa by European powers had been nearly 
impossible.  In  the  early  19
th  century,  European  presence  in  the  African 
mainland was restricted to the Capeland (Dutch/British); Bathurst, Freetown, 
and  Accra  (British);  Senegambia  (French);  and  Angola  and  Mozambique 
(Portuguese). With the exception of Capeland, this European presence was 
confined to coastal bases or narrow coastal strips. The reasons for Africa’s 
immunity to European overseas power projection were primarily geographical 
(very  high  European  mortality  rates  owing  to  tropical  diseases)  and 
demographic (the demographic imbalance favouring native populations could 
not  be  offset  with  the  military  technology  of  the  day).  Improved  disease 
control and new military technology (magazine rifles, maxim gun) changed   9 
the power balance dramatically in the latter half of the 19
th century and led to 
the partition of much of Africa in the Congress of Berlin (1884-5). 
African agriculture had developed very slowly in the centuries running up to 
the 19
th century. This is mostly due to low-yielding crops and relative absence 
of  mammals  suitable  for  domestication  in  SSA.  As  big  and  domesticated 
mammals  are  important  for  food  production  and  animal  traction,  their 
inexistence in SSA resulted in larger reliance on human slavery for transport 
duties on the continent. Tropical Africa formed a formidable barrier to the 
propagation  of  crops  and  livestock  from  Europe/Asia  into  more  temperate 
regions of Southern Africa. Diamond (1997) presents an excellent overview of 
the geographical factors that impeded faster agricultural productivity growth 
in  pre-20
th  century  Africa.  Subsequent  European  colonization  gradually 
removed some of the constraints that African agriculture had previously faced. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  of  new  livestock  and  crops,  but  also  the 
monopolization  of  violence  by  the  colonial  state  resulting  in  widespread 
pacification across SSA. 
Thus, the experience of previous centuries in Africa seems to be of limited 
relevance  for  explaining  present  day  differences  in  economic  performance 
among African nations (Collier and Gunning, 1999b). This situation contrasts 
with the history of the western hemisphere, where massive demographic shifts 
from  the  16
th  century  onwards  shaped  the  American  nations  of  today  and 
explain to a large extent differential economic performance in the Americas
4.  
The earliest available estimates on income levels in sub-Saharan Africa come 
from Maddison (2003). His estimates for 1950 GDP per capita in Africa show 
a coefficient of correlation of 0.43 with 2003 data on income levels for the 
same countries. Therefore, present-day differences economic performance are 
to a large extent the result of developments in the 20
th century, with the first 
half  of  the  century  (colonization)  carrying  less  weight  than  the  latter  half 
                                                
4 See for example Engerman and Sokoloff (1997).    10 
(post-independence) in explaining current economic performance. Dispersion 
of income levels in African countries has increased markedly since 1950.  
The  wealthiest  countries  in  Africa  in  1950  were  southern  African  (South 
Africa, Namibia), small island nations (Mauritius, Seychelles), or otherwise 
oil producing with a relatively small population (Gabon)
5. This trend persists 
to the present: in 2003, the countries with highest per capita income levels 
were  situated  in  Southern  Africa  (South  Africa,  Botswana,  Namibia, 
Swaziland),  small  island  states  (Mauritius,  Seychelles,  Cape  Verde),  or 
combined significant oil production with low population (Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon). 
Less obvious are the common denominators for Africa’s poorest nations in 
1950:  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Burundi,  Malawi,  and 
Ethiopia (including Eritrea). No clear trend is visible as these countries differ 
widely  in  size,  location  and  colonizing entity.  Regarding  income  levels  in 
2003,  two  new  and  post-colonial  explanatory  factors  for  poor  economic 
performance  emerge:  armed  conflicts  and  poor  policies.  Among  the seven 
poorest countries, five were particularly affected by wars of different nature: 
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth DR 
Congo), Burundi, and Sierra Leone. The two remaining countries, Tanzania 
and Malawi, although generally peaceful, are well known for persistently poor 
economic policies (poor macroeconomic environment, socialism, etc.
6). 
Individually, Botswana’s extraordinary performance in the period 1950-1990 
with  an  average  annual  increase  in  GDP  per  capita  of  10%  should  be 
highlighted. Unparalleled are the growth rates in Equatorial Guinea over the 
1996-2004 period (with an average annual growth rate in GDP per capita of 
39.3%).  Equatorial  Guinea’s  growth  rates  are  a  direct  result  of  coupling 
significant oil revenues with a relatively small population. Other countries that 
did particularly well include Swaziland (9.3% per annum) and Guinea-Bissau 
                                                
5 See table A3. 
6 See for example Collier and Gunning (1999a).   11 
(8.9%) in the period to 1973, and the small island nations of Cape Verde 
(7.8%) and Mauritius (5.5%) during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Since 1996 the 
highest  growth  rates  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  were  observed  for  Equatorial 
Guinea, Mozambique (6.4% per annum), and Chad (5.7%). The latter recently 
joined  the  restricted  group  of  oil  producing  African  countries,  while 
Mozambique is converging to pre-1973 levels of income following two dismal 
decades characterized by civil war and poor economic policies. 
African economic performance was generally much more encouraging up to 
the early 1970’s. Indeed, only four countries registered a decline in income 
levels during the 1950-1973 period: Niger (-0.4% per annum), Chad (-0.4%), 
Sudan (-0.2%), and Benin (-0.1%). These countries are situated in, or in the 
vicinity of, the Sahel region. At first glance, this seems to support the rainfall 
hypothesis, as the Sahel region was the worst hit by the generalized lack of 
rainfall  in  the  second  half  of  the  20
th  century.  However,  a  more  careful 
examination shows that rainfall started to decline only in the 1970’s and was 
more  pronounced  in  the  western  Sahel  region  (Mauritania,  Senegal,  The 
Gambia)  than  in  these  particular  countries
7.  All  four  countries  had  more 
precipitation in the period 1950-1970 than in the previous half century, in 
accordance  with  the  wider  African  trend  of  particularly  high  levels  of 
precipitation in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Consequently, the relative and absolute 
economic decline of these four countries preceded the climatic change.  
The two decades starting in the mid-1970’s witnessed a completely different 
outlook as economic regress became much more widespread. Income levels 
fell in 29 out of 47 African countries in our sample. Of all countries, the most 
dramatic drops were observed for Angola (-2.9% per annum), Mozambique (-
2.4%), and former Zaire (-2.2%). As a result, by 1990 the GDP per capita for 
Angola was about half of its 1973 level. Although African growth rates have 
recovered in recent years, the economic decline persisted for some African 
                                                
7 For data on precipitation levels, see Barrios et al. (2003).   12 
countries. The worst hit countries in 1996-2004 are: Guinea-Bissau (-4.8% per 
annum), Zimbabwe (-3.7%), and DR Congo (-3.3%). 
What do these countries have in common? It is manifest that these countries 
suffered  from  poor  economic  policies  (almost  all),  civil  war  (Angola, 
Mozambique, DR Congo), and/or persistent political instability with a strong 
negative impact on economic activity (Guinea-Bissau). Additionally, some of 
these countries lost most of their European or Asian populations, which until 
then  had  contributed  considerably  to  their  relative  prosperity  (Angola, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe). 
 
Table A4 offers a different perspective on economic performance in Africa. 
Panel A presents aggregate data for African sub-regions, whereas panel B 
clusters the countries in accordance with the nationality of the colonizer. This 
exercise  might  be  useful  as  it  permits  some  insight  into  the  “horserace” 
between  natural  endowments  and  legal  origin.  Several  authors  conducted 
research on the relative merits of the law view and the endowments hypothesis 
for explaining development in the long run
8. 
Panel A shows that only two groups of African countries stand out from the 
crowd: Southern Africa and the small island nations. The latter exhibit higher 
income levels than the rest of the continent and the gap has been increasing 
steadily  since  the  1970’s.  This  group  combines  countries  that  successfully 
invested in service industries (Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde) with oil 
producing  countries  (particularly  Equatorial  Guinea).  So  far  and  from  this 
group, only São Tomé and Príncipe and the Comoro islands have failed to 
follow this path. 
Southern Africa had in the period 1950-90 income levels that approximately 
doubled the African average. The 2003 data, from a different source, shows an 
even  wider  income  gap.  Although  South  Africa  carries  much  weight  in 
explaining this regional difference, it is by no means the only country in the 
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region  with  a  GDP  per  capita significantly  above  average  African  income 
levels. Indeed, at any moment since 1950 most Southern African countries 
had income levels above the median African GDP per capita. The 1950 data 
show that Southern African relative prosperity had been mostly confined to 
South Africa and Namibia, and to a lesser extent to Angola and Mozambique, 
yet this region includes several small countries that achieved very high growth 
rates over sustained periods (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho). In fact, by 2003 
only  landlocked  Zambia  and  Malawi  were  relatively  poor  by  African 
standards. 
As for the rest of the continent, the narrow range is remarkable, with income 
levels in 2003 ranging from 1051$ in Eastern Africa to 1258$ in Western 
Africa. It is worth mentioning that the Sahel Region as a whole is the only one 
to escape the general trend of declining income levels in the 1973-90 period. 
This is the more surprising considering that this region was the worst hit by 
the relative drought of the 1970’s and 1980’s. In fact, this region was the 
worst performing in the period 1950-73 characterized by abundant rainfall. 
Conversely, Eastern Africa has been persistently the poorest part of Africa. 
One possible explanation here advanced is that this region combines unusually 
low natural resource endowments with large populations. 
It is impossible to dissociate SSA’s economic fortunes from those of its most 
populous country, Nigeria. The broader African trends are replicated and even 
amplified in Nigeria: fast growth in the period to 1973, economic regression 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and moderate growth since. As a result, Nigerian 
GDP per capita fell below the median African income level in 2003. However, 
it should be noted that the 2003 estimates use a different source, and as such 
are  not  directly  comparable  to  the  historical  statistics  as  estimates  from 
different  origins  vary  considerably.  This  note  of  caution  is  particularly 
pertinent in the case of estimates for African countries.   
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Panel  B  shows  the  same  countries  in  the  same  periods,  but  now  grouped 
according to the identity of the colonizer. The control group “Other” includes 
countries that were never colonized (Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea), countries that 
were the single SSA colony of a European power (Equatorial Guinea was a 
Spanish  colony),  and  countries  where  the  identity  of  the  colonizer  is  not 
obvious  (South  Africa,  Somalia,  Namibia,  Cameroon).  This  control  group, 
strongly influenced by South Africa’s economy, is by far the most prosperous. 
The gap in income levels is clearly evident with the 2003 data, although the 
historical data exhibits a much more mitigated disparity, particularly before 
1990. 
Remarkable is the similarity between English and French speaking countries. 
Throughout all the second half of the 20
th century, the difference in GDP per 
capita between these two groups of countries never reached 10%.  By 2003, 
both groups of countries diverged by less than 1% in their income levels. 
The Portuguese speaking countries exhibit relatively high levels of income 
since 1950. The exception is the period 1973-90 when civil war, poor policies, 
and the exodus of European populations caused strong economic contraction 
in  Angola  and  Mozambique.  This  result  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
Portuguese colonial authorities were more competent than others at promoting 
economic  growth.  Rather,  it  is  likely  the  result  of  the bulk  of  Portuguese 
colonization in Africa being situated in economically more viable Southern 
Africa (94% of Portuguese speaking African populations are concentrated in 
Angola and Mozambique). 
Former Belgian colonies are persistently poorer than other African countries. 
However,  with  only  three  countries  in  this  group  it  is  difficult  to  reach 
substantive  conclusions  and  the  relatively  benign  economic  outlook  of 
present-day Rwanda confirms that having been colonized by Belgium was not 
necessarily a curse.  
This  survey  suggests  that  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  entity  of  the 
colonizer,  or  for  that  matter  the  origin  of  the  legal  system,  significantly   15 
impacts the economic performance of African nations. On the other hand, it is 
possible that others forces (geographical factors, location, disease ecology) 
mask the role played by colonial administrations. Consequently, the entity of 
the colonizer will be included as control variables in section four.  
On the whole, the picture that emerges is that in the period to 1950 location 
was  important.  Only  small  islands  and  coastal  Southern  Africa  exhibit 
systematically higher income levels. Landlocked Southern African countries 
(Malawi, Zambia) were comparatively poorer. In the second half of the 20
th 
century  peace  (or  the  lack  thereof)  and  policies  became  increasingly 
important, as these could not be assured any longer by the colonial state.              
 
3.  THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Appendix A contains the data on the variables used in this paper. Table A1 
presents  the  complete  list  of  variables  used,  together  with  their  respective 
definitions and sources, while the descriptive statistics for the same variables 
can be seen in table A2. 
 
Tables  A3  to  A7  present new  data  specifically  constructed  for  this  paper. 
Tables A3 and A4, already discussed in the previous section, present data on 
GDP per head for countries presented individually or grouped according to 
geographical or historical attributes. Although it is normal that GDP estimates 
from different sources vary, nowhere are the discrepancies more felt than in 
SSA. This is particularly notorious for Guinea and Congo, to name just two 
examples. Most alternative GDP data (IMF, 2001 data from Maddison (2003), 
2000 data from the World Penn Tables) show that Congo has relatively high 
levels  of  income  for  African  standards.  On  the  contrary,  the  IMF  and 
Maddison (2003) coincide in considering Guinea relatively poor whilst the 
Human  Development  Report  2005  and  the  World  Penn  Tables  advance   16 
estimates that are well above the African median country. These discrepancies 
point to considerable error in the variable for GDP estimates. 
Table A5 presents data on rainfall levels from Barrios et al. (2003). This time 
series data on the average annual rainfall for 289 states, islands, and territories 
is  taken  from  (IPCC  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  2001). 
Shown is the variation in precipitation in the decades since 1950, with all 
precipitation levels being compared to average rainfall levels in the period 
1900-1949. The data is obtained by calculating the variation for individual 
countries and subsequently computing the regional averages. The relatively 
“wet” decades of 1950 to 1970 are clearly visible in the first two columns. 
The climatic outlook altered significantly in the 1970’s for the Sahel Region 
and  Western  Africa.  These  two  regions  suffered  from  considerably  lower 
levels of rainfall in most of the 1970-1998 period. This general decline of 
rainfall is more recent in Southern Africa and simply inexistent in Central and 
Eastern Africa. The regression analysis uses the estimates obtained for the 
1970-1998 period, visible in the last column. 
 
Considering the importance of armed conflicts for explaining Africa’s poor 
economic performance, an updated variable that measures these conflicts is 
clearly  needed.  Unfortunately,  even  the  recent  literature  presents  data  on 
length  and  intensity  of  conflicts that  refers  to  the late  1990’s  at best.  For 
example, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) present time varying (quinquennial) 
data on the number of years of civil wars for the 1955-1990 period. This data 
is not appropriate for level regressions that have GDP per capita in 2003 as the 
response variable. Accordingly, table A6 presents a new effort at measuring 
the number of years of armed conflicts between 1990 and 2003. Low-intensity 
conflicts,  or  regionally  limited  conflicts,  without  significant  nationwide 
economic  impact  were  not  included  (Ghana,  Kenya,  Mali,  Namibia,  and 
Nigeria). The first column presents the countries considered in Collier and 
Gunning (1999a) to have had civil wars in the 1990’s (prior to 1998). The   17 
second  column  presents  estimates  based  on  information  from  Kinder  and 
Hilgemann  (2003),  while  the  third  column  presents  estimates  based  on 
information from the Peace Pledge Union. Naturally, different authors might 
characterize  the  very  same  conflict  using  different  criteria  and  thus  reach 
different conclusions. Therefore, when these two sources differ the mean was 
adopted as estimate for the length of the conflict. According to these new 
estimates, the countries that are most affected by recent armed conflicts are: 
Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Liberia. 
 
Finally, table A7 presents estimates on the fraction of the population that is 
European  or  from  European  descent.  Several  authors  find  that  these 
populations might have impacted economic development (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Vaz Silva, 2005). Additionally, table A4 shows that Southern Africa has 
substantially higher income levels than other African regions. It is possible 
that  this  difference  might  be  partially  explained  with  more  significant 
European  settlements  in  this  region.  In  order  to  examine  this  hypothesis, 
European settlements is included as additional control variable. Following the 
methodology and reasoning adopted in Vaz Silva (2004), the highest fraction 
of  the  population  from  European  descent  was  adopted  as  opposed  to  the 
fraction on a particular moment in time. This approach seems reasonable since 
it allows for a more accurate measurement of the impact European settlements 
had on institutions and economic performance. Even if European populations 
left the ex-colony, it is likely that their presence had some long-lasting effects 
in the country. 
On the whole, European settlements are far less common in Africa than in the 
western  hemisphere.  Only  six  African  countries  had  at  any  point  in  time 
European minorities that composed at least 5% of the total population: South 
Africa  (22%),  Mauritius  (17%),  Angola  (9%),  Zimbabwe  (7%),  Namibia 
(6%),  and  São  Tomé  and  Príncipe  (5%).  These  countries  are  either island   18 
nations  or  situated  in  more  temperate  Southern  Africa,  and  have  been 
relatively prosperous for African standards since 1950.                   
 
4.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  Explaining institutional development in Africa 
 
Before  we  turn  to  level  regression  analysis  with  income  levels  as  the 
dependent variable, it is important to explore the determinants of institutional 
development in Africa. Apart from its intrinsic interest, this scrutiny might be 
useful  insofar  as  it  allows  the  identification  of  viable  instruments  for 
institutional quality, which can be used in subsequent instrumental variable 
(IV) regression analysis. 
 
The estimates from this analysis are reported in appendix B. Table B1 shows 
in panel A the independent variables related to the settlement hypothesis first 
proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001). The underlying assumption is that in 
places  where  the  disease  ecology  was  benign,  Europeans  established 
settlement colonies with growth inducing institutions such as secure property 
rights (e.g. South Africa). Conversely, where the disease environment was less 
favourable, Europeans would set up an “extractive state” whose institutional 
framework was primarily designed for the conservation of power in the hands 
of a small colonial elite. Column (1) uses the original Log European settler 
mortality variable (henceforth ESM), while the remaining equations test the 
alternative measures proposed in Vaz Silva (2004).  
All variables have coefficients with the expected sign, but the ESM variable is 
not statistically significant. In addition, the climate variable shown in equation 
(4), although marginally significant, bears little explanatory power. The best 
fits are obtained with the land variable in column (2) and with the disease 
variable in column (3).    19 
Panel B examines the importance of colonial origin or geographic location for 
institutional development. Column (1) reports the coefficients of the colonial 
dummies, and it is visible that all are statistically insignificant. Whatever the 
reasons  for  better  or  worse  governance  across  Africa,  the  entity  of  the 
colonizer does not seem to matter. Column (2) adds dummy variables for the 
two economically more successful regions in Africa. The results suggest that 
Southern African countries have indeed better institutions and the magnitude 
of the coefficient (0.48) corresponds to almost one standard deviation in the 
institutions  variable.  It  is  possible  to  argue  that  location  influenced  the 
institutional development in the colonies. In order to examine this hypothesis, 
column  (3) adds the  location dummies  as  control variables  to  the original 
specification  in  equation  (1).  As  a  result,  the  coefficients  for  the  colonial 
origin dummies move in the expected direction: the French and the Belgian 
colonial  dummies  improve  slightly,  while  the  British  and  the  Portuguese 
colonial dummies fall somewhat.  This is certainly due to the fact that Britain 
and  Portugal  shared  Southern  Africa  between  them,  whereas  Belgian  and 
French colonies were situated in more tropical (and poorer) parts of Africa. 
However, all colonial dummies remain statistically insignificant at the same 
time  as  the  Southern  Africa  remains  significant  even  after  controlling  for 
colonial origin. 
 
Panel A in table B2 examines other explanatory factors that are often referred 
in literature on institutions and growth. The two measures of ELF included in 
columns (1) and (2) are not found to be statistically significant determinants of 
institutional quality. Column (3) shows that the impact of armed conflicts on 
institutions is large, negative, and significant (-0.07 per year of conflict). Oil 
exports and mineral exports have different impacts on institutions: the effect 
of major oil exports on institutional development is large and adverse, but 
mineral  exports  do  not  seem  to  affect  national  institutions  significantly. 
Column  (4)  also  shows  that  landlocked  countries  do  not  suffer  from   20 
considerably worse governance than their coastal counterparts, once natural 
resources  are  controlled  for.  If  being  landlocked  affects  economic 
performance,  as  often  suggested  in  literature,  its  effects  must  run  through 
different channels of causation (e.g. difficulty of trade). 
Finally, panel B in table B2 puts it all together as all variables previously 
found to be significant determinants of institutional quality are included in the 
same specification. The land, oil, and war variables remain significant with 
the anticipated signs and cause the Southern Africa dummy to disappear. The 
inclusion of the disease variable, as in column (2) adds little to the equation 
obtained in column (1). 
These results seem to confirm the “natural resource curse” since oil exporting 
African  countries  have  significantly  worse  institutions.  These  estimates 
suggest that vast oil resources alone are responsible for Nigeria’s institutions 
poor  ranking  (-1.1).  Were  it  not  for  oil,  Nigeria  could  expect  to  see  its 
governance  improve  to  African  average  (approximately  to  the  level  of 
Rwanda  –0.64).  War  also  affects  economic  institutions  adversely,  the 
estimated  impact  being  large  and  negative.  The  long  civil  war  in  Sudan 
explains this country’s poor institutions (-1.25). Excluding the impact of war, 
Sudan could expect to have institutions more on the level of Ethiopia’s (-
0.55), recently very popular with western aid donors. Perhaps more surprising 
is  the  large  and  positive  coefficient  of  the  land  variable.  This  last  result 
suggests  that  sparsely  populated  African  countries  developed  better 
institutions than densely populated ones. Nevertheless, the next section will 
show  that the land variable has  direct  effects on income  levels even  after 
controlling for institutions. This finding casts some doubts on the direction of 
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4.2  Explaining economic development in Africa       
                
The next step is to examine determinants of economic development in SSA. 
For that purpose, the ordinary least squares regressions in tables C1 and C2 
have the following specification: 
 
(1)  log yi = a + b1Insi +  b2Landlocki + ci´g + ei, 
 
where  yi is income per capita in country  i in 2003, Insi is the  measure of 
institutional  development,  Landlocki  is  the  dummy  variable  for  landlocked 
location, ci is a vector of other covariates, and ei  is a random error term. This 
design permits the scrutiny of variables that might plausibly be correlated with 
economic  outcomes  once  institutional  quality  and  geographic  location  are 
controlled for. Although geographic location is here proxied by landlocked 
status, other geography variables will be considered as potential determinants 
of  economic  performance.  Landlocked  location  is  often  found  to  have  a 
negative impact on economic development through higher transaction costs 
and this effect is exacerbated in Africa, as this continent has a particularly 
high  proportion  of  landlocked  countries.  Adam  Smith  noted  this  negative 
effect on commerce and communication as early as 1776. 
Panel A in table C1 presents additional geography- and demography-related 
controls.  Column  (2)  shows that  the  land  variable  remains significant  and 
positive  after  controlling  for  institutions.  While  this  result  eliminates  one 
possible instrument for institutional quality in subsequent IV regressions, it 
also opens new questions as it not entirely clear why more land available per 
inhabitant  in  1850  should  have  a  direct  impact  on  economic  performance 
today.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  this  variable,  being  positively 
correlated  to  present-day  population  densities,  is  capturing  the  effect  of 
overall population size or population density on income levels. Column (3) 
reports that population size is indeed negatively correlated to income levels in   22 
SSA  and  its  coefficient  is  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Population  density, 
reported in equation (4) is not statistically significant. These results reflect the 
fact that African GDP are to a large extent determined by the extraction of 
natural resources. Increased population merely depresses the overhead wealth 
created  by  these  activities  without  the  creation  of  “endogenous”  growth. 
Additionally, it might be easier to measure correctly an increased population 
than  to  measure  the  new  economic  activities  created  by  these  larger 
populations as these are in Africa often employed outside the formal economy 
(e.g. subsistence farming). The statistical effect is to increase the denominator 
in  the  GDP  per  capita  calculus  without  the  corresponding  increase  in  the 
numerator. 
Columns (5) to (7) present three other geography-related variables. Although 
all have the “correct” sign, none of these variables is significant at the 10% 
level  once  institutions  and  landlocked  location  are  controlled  for.  Several 
recent papers reach the conclusion that geography has little or no direct effect 
on  income  as  its  role  operates  predominantly  or  exclusively  through  the 
choice  of  institutions  (Acemoglu  et  al.,  2001;  Easterly  and  Levine,  2002; 
Rodrik et al., 2002). On the other hand, Sachs (2003) maintains that malaria 
transmission,  itself strongly affected  by  ecological conditions,  has  a direct 
effect on the level of per capita income even after controlling for institutional 
quality. 
Perhaps more surprising is the negligible impact that reduced rainfall in Africa 
had on income levels. However, caution is advised as the methodology used in 
Barrios et al. (2003) diverges substantially from the methodology used in this 
paper:  they  use  an  economic  growth  framework  versus  level  regression 
analysis here, a different set of control variables, and different data sources for 
GDP per capita. It is important to note that the equations in Dry Times in 
Africa do  not  include  institutions  as control variable  and  that  the data  for 
income levels comes from the World Penn Tables (6.1) instead of Maddison   23 
(2003). The differences in estimates for GDP per capita are very pronounced 
for some African countries.  
Panel B shows the same basic specification with new covariates. According to 
equation (1), European settlements had a significant and positive direct impact 
on  income.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  examine  this  hypothesis  with 
additional controls, as Europeans settled in the most temperate parts of the 
African continent and the direction of causality cannot be established with this 
equation  alone.  Column  (2)  reports  the  coefficients  of  the  colonial  entity 
dummies. Although the institutions variable remains significant, the colonial 
dummies  are  statistically  insignificant  suggesting  that  the  origin  of  the 
colonizer  does  not  have  a  direct  impact  on  levels  of  income  (through 
infrastructure for example). The results in table B1 had already shown that the 
origin of the colonizer is not strongly related to institutional quality in African 
countries. 
 
Table  C2  replicates  the  model  specification  seen  in  table  C1  with  new 
regressors. The first two columns show that oil and mineral exporting are both 
statistically significant at the 5% level and have the predicted (positive) sign. 
Conversely, columns (3) and (4) demonstrate that ELF does not have a linear 
relationship  with income once  institutions  are  controlled for (regardless of 
which measure of ELF we use). Column (5) adds regional dummies for the 
two  regions  that  exhibit  the  best  economic  performance  in  Africa.  Both 
coefficients  are  statistically  and  quantitatively  relevant.  This  last  result 
suggests  that  the  relative  prosperity  of  these  regions  cannot  be  explained 
uniquely  with  better  institutions,  but  that  other  forces  might  be  at  play. 
Remarkable is equation (6): the coefficient on war is negative and large (4 log 
points or 4% per year of armed conflict) but is not significant at the 10% 
significance  level  after  taking  the  effects  of  institutions  and  landlocked 
location into account. It is possible that the usually devastating effect of armed 
conflicts  on  economic  activity  is  here  incorrectly  measured  (error  in  the   24 
variable) or that the institutions variable already incorporates the effects of 
armed  conflicts.  Interestingly,  the  inclusion  of  the  war  variable  in  this 
equation causes the institutions variable to be not significant at the 10% level. 
On the plus side, this result allows us to explore the war variable as instrument 
for institutions in subsequent IV regressions, as this variable is statistically 
related  to  institutional  quality  and  does  not  seem  to  be  related  to  income 
otherwise than through its effect on institutions.  
Finally, panel B in table C2 adds the policy variables trade (as a percentage of 
GDP), investments (idem), schooling, and log illiteracy rates. All of them are 
significant at the 5% or 1% significance levels and have the anticipated signs. 
 
Table  C3  brings  all  this  together  in  more  inclusive  ordinary  least  squares 
regressions. The identification strategy here proposed is to include a large 
number of regressors and to test successively for the exclusion of not relevant 
determinants.  For  that  purpose,  we  include  in  the  basic  specification  all 
controls found to be significant in tables C1 and C2. The exception is the 
European settlements variable since the coefficient of this variable was not 
longer  significant  after  controlling  for  small  island  or  Southern  African 
location (not shown). Both regional dummies remained significant at the 10% 
or 5% significance level in this regression. Since most Europeans settled in 
Southern Africa, the Europeans variable was effectively capturing the effect 
of other forces that cause this part of Africa to have higher incomes. European 
populations outside of temperate Southern Africa had little or no impact on 
national levels of income. 
Column (1) reports the coefficients in the most inclusive model specification. 
The independent variables in this equation explain 80% of the variability in 
income levels across SSA and only institutions, the mineral dummy, and the 
small  island  dummy  are  significant  (at  the  5%  level).  Remarkably,  the 
southern  Africa  dummy  has  now  the  “wrong”  sign  and  is  insignificant   25 
suggesting that this positive regional effect can be sufficiently explained with 
the remaining independent variables. 
 Replacing the land variable with log population (as in the second column) 
adds  nothing  to  the  model.  The  R-squared  drops  somewhat  and  only  two 
determinants remain significant. 
Column (3) repeats equation (1) with the exclusion of the Southern Africa 
dummy. The F-test for excluded variables does not reject the null hypothesis 
and  the  overall  cost  to  the  model  is  negligible.  Considering  the  high 
correlation between schooling and illiteracy rates, it might be irrelevant to 
include both proxies of human capital in the same specification. Accordingly, 
equation (4) excludes log illiteracy rates from the model. Again, the F-test 
does  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  and  the  R-squared  remains  virtually 
unchanged at 0.79.  
Column (5) excludes the oil-exporting dummy with very similar results and 
column (6) tests the exclusion of the land variable. However, the F-test for 
this last exclusion easily rejects the null hypothesis and the R-squared now 
falls  more  markedly  to  0.71.  It  seems  that  the  land  variable,  although 
individually insignificant, carries considerable joint explanatory power within 
this specification. 
Equation (7) tests instead the exclusion of the schooling variable, and in this 
case the null hypothesis is not rejected while the cost to the R-squared is much 
more mitigated. Hence, the specification in column (7) will serve as our basic 
regression in the IV regression analysis. 
 
Table C4 reports the instrumental variable estimates. For ease of comparison 
the original OLS estimates are shown in column (1). Column (2) presents the 
estimates obtained with war as instrument for our measure of institutions. The 
coefficient  of  institutions  increases  slightly  to  0.73  suggesting  that  the 
attenuation bias due to measurement error more than offsets reverse causality 
and  omitted  variables  biases.  The  other  coefficients  of  interest  are  not   26 
significantly affected by instrumenting for institutions. Using log European 
settler mortality rates as instrument for institutions as in column (3) clearly 
affects the precision of the estimates. All our explanatory variables have now 
p-values above 0.1 and the sample size drops to 25 observations. Column (4) 
basically reproduces equation (2) with the only difference that trade is now 
instrumented by landlocked status. The coefficient of trade doubles but once 
again the precision of the estimates is visibly affected. 
 
In table C5, I show the 36 African countries for which no data is missing, 
along with actual levels of income and their predicted income levels from the 
regressions.  The  results  are  that  the  restricted  OLS  regression  (with  six 
independent variables) presents very similar estimates to the ones obtained 
with the unrestricted OLS regression (nine independent variables): the median 
deviation from observed values (median y-￿) increases moderately from 21.4 
to 22.8  and  the difference for  the  average  deviation  is  even  smaller  (34.1 
versus 34.0). The benefit of IV regression analysis in this particular case is not 
obvious, as the estimates do not differ significantly from the OLS estimates. 
The last column presents estimates for the IV regression with instruments for 
institutions and trade, even if this regression presents the largest departure to 
the actual values for GDP per capita. Overall, the best estimates are obtained 
with OLS or IV with only institutions being treated as endogenous. 
 
The predicted GDP per capita levels are particularly accurate for Sierra Leone, 
the Central African Republic, Senegal, DR Congo, and Burkina Faso. It is 
important to note that this group of countries includes three countries that are 
located in arid or semi-arid areas (Central African Republic, Senegal, Burkina 
Faso), yet their levels of income are correctly predicted without accounting for 
reduced rainfall. This provides further evidence for the small importance of 
precipitation  levels  for  explaining  income  in  Africa.  On  the  other  hand, 
deviations  are  particularly  large  for  South  Africa,  Gabon,  Guinea,  Congo,   27 
Zambia,  Madagascar,  Tanzania,  and  Malawi.  South  Africa  and  Gabon  are 
atypical  countries  for  Africa:  South  Africa  is  singular  owing  to  its  heavy 
reliance  on  white  taxpayers  and  Gabon  combines  large  oil  wealth  with  a 
relatively small population (inadequately proxied by the oil dummy).  As for 
Guinea and Congo, the problem seems to lie in the measurement of their GDP 
per  capita.  The  predicted  income  for  Guinea  ranges  from  900$  to  1000$ 
(actual  value  is  2097$),  while  the  fitted  values  for  Congo  (1400$-2000$) 
overestimate the observed GDP per capita of 965$. 
It is possible that the predicted levels of income are closer to the real levels for 
these two countries than is suggested by the “real” values of GDP per capita 
used  in  the  Human  Development  Report,  considering  the  substantial 
discrepancies in the measurement of GDP from different sources. 
As  for  the  remaining  four  countries  (Zambia,  Malawi,  Tanzania,  and 
Madagascar),  the  predicted  values  systematically  overestimate  the  actual 
income levels. Here the main culprit seems to be the institutions variable. All 
four countries are credited with relatively good institutions in the reports of 
survey  institutes  and  international  organizations,  although  these  do  not 
translate into higher growth rates. One possibility is that responses on the 
quality of governance in these four countries overrate the “true” quality of 
economic institutions in these countries.                                       
      
5.      CONCLUDING REMARKS 
      
In  this  paper  I  argue  that  differences  in  income  per  capita  across  African 
countries can be explained to a large extent with a few variables: quality of 
economic  institutions,  trade,  population  density  in  the  19
th  century, 
investment, mineral resources, and a dummy variable for small island nations.  
One striking difference to other regions in the world is the significance of 
policies (trade, investment) for level regressions with income per capita as the   28 
dependent  variable.  Illiteracy  rates  and  schooling  are  also  statistically  and 
quantitatively significant in some of the regressions. 
Rodrik et al. (2002) argue that policies should be viewed as a flow variable, in 
contrast to institutions, which is a stock variable. Accordingly, institutions are 
the  cumulative  outcome  of  past  policy  actions  and  their  relative  quality 
already  contains  all  the  relevant  information  about  the  impact  of  policies. 
They conclude that policy variables should be employed in growth regressions 
and measures of institutional quality should be used in level regressions. This 
argument works well with worldwide samples but in this paper we saw that 
some  policy  variables  remain  significant  in  an  African  sample  even  after 
controlling for institutions. History is likely to be responsible for this finding: 
whereas the societal and economic structure of American nations was largely 
shaped prior to the 19
th century, the economic performance of African regions 
remained remarkably levelled until the end of the colonization period (coastal 
Southern Africa is here the exception). Policy actions started to diverge more 
markedly  once  colonial  administrations  withdrew  and  their  outcomes 
influence present income levels in Africa. It seems likely that in the case of 
Africa  more  time  is  required  until  measures  of  institutional  quality  fully 
reflect past policy actions. 
Equally  surprising  is  the  importance  of  the  land  availability  variable  for 
explaining levels of income in SSA. This variable is statistically related to 
present population density but bears more explanatory power than the latter. 
To some extent, this reflects the findings in Acemoglu et al. (2002). Although 
at present population density and income are negatively correlated in Africa, 
high population densities around the equator suggest that in the past these 
regions  had  higher  levels  of  agricultural  productivity.  European  presence 
reversed  this  trend  as  their  crops,  livestock,  and  technology  proved  more 
suitable  to  temperate  regions  further  away  from  the  equator.  Part  of  this 
causality also flows via institutions, as these low population density regions 
attracted more European settlers (Acemoglu et al., 2001).             29 
Finally,  we  see  the  importance  of  institutional  quality  for  economic 
performance  in  the  long  run  confirmed.  The  estimated  magnitude  of  the 
coefficient  on  the  institutions  variable  (around  0.7)  is  very  similar  to  the 
estimated impact of better governance on economic performance found for the 
western  hemisphere  using  the  same  measure  of  institutional  quality  (Vaz 
Silva,  2005).  This  means  that,  if  Nigeria  could  improve  its  institutional 
framework by one standard deviation (to approximately the level of Gabon), 
then its level of income would rise over time to 1560$ (an increase of more 
than  50%).  The  same  can  be  said  of  Kenya:  a  one  standard  deviation 
improvement in institutional quality (to the level of Senegal or Ghana) could 
cause its GDP per capita to rise by 50% to 1540$.    
In this paper we also identified a new instrument for institutions. Our measure 
for armed conflicts is negatively related to the quality of economic institutions 
but does not seem to affect income levels otherwise than through institutions. 
However, the case for IV regression analysis applied to an African sample is 
not  evident  as  the  coefficient  on  institutions  changes  little  with 
instrumentation (from 0.67 to 0.73). 
One final word of caution is necessary in this context. It is never easy to 
estimate correctly levels of economic or institutional development, and the 
more so for African countries. Estimates vary substantially depending on the 
source  we  adopt,  and  causing  the  adopted  proxies  for  Africa’s  growth 
constraints to be at times deficient. The poor data quality for African countries 
ultimately  bears the risk  that the  effects of  some  of  Africa’s  idiosyncratic 
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Figure 1.1: ELFand support for rebellions 
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